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1 Introduction
Under homotheticity, everything there is to know about an agent’s preference is implicit in a single
indifference set. When there are only two goods, which is common in experimental economics, a preference
can therefore be completely summarized graphically by showing a single indifference curve.
A finite set of choice data will, of course, only reveal a part of an agent’s preference. This part can
be recovered using nonparametric revealed preference techniques as suggested by Varian (1982), who
shows how to construct bounds on indifference sets from a set of price and quantity data.1 Knoblauch
(1993) extends this approach by imposing homotheticity, which allows to construct substantially tighter
bounds. However, she requires that data are perfectly consistent with homothetic utility maximization,
which is very restrictive and almost never the case. Therefore, to the best of the authors’ knowledge,
the technique has never been applied. In this paper, we show how to implement Knoblauch’s method
when there are minor violations of homotheticity in the data. Our procedure adjusts the data using the
homothetic efficiency approach as suggested by Heufer (2013) and Heufer and Hjertstrand (2017).2
Consider Figure 1, which uses choice data from a subject of an experiment conducted by Fisman et al.
(2007). The hatched areas show the revealed preferred and revealed worse set for one of the subject’s
choices using Varian’s (1982) technique. These two areas are the bounds on the indifference curve implied
by the subject’s choices. The indifference curve through the indicated point has to be somewhere in
between the hatched parts.
x1
x2
Figure 1: Recovered bounds on preferred and worse sets using data from Fisman et al. (2007): With
(solid) and without (hatched) using homothetic recoverability (subject 14).
The choices contain some minor violations of homothetic utility maximization, so Knoblauch’s (1993)
technique cannot be applied directly. However, by adjusting the data, our version of Knoblauch’s (1993)
technique can provide bounds under homotheticity. The solidly shaded areas show the homothetically
1In a recent paper, Halevy et al. (2017) show that these bounds rely on the assumption of convexity of preferences and
propose alternative bounds based only on the assumption of monotonicity.
2 What constitutes a “minor” violation is subjective. Varian (1990) suggests to use an efficiency level of 95% but points
out that the level should depend on the problem at hand, that is, the number of observations, the power of the test, and
the model under consideration. Fisman et al. (2007), whose data we use in this paper, use an efficiency threshold of 80%.
We do not take a direct stand on what constitutes a reasonable threshold but encourage readers to make up their own
minds whether they consider a reported efficiency level to be small or large. One possible approach is to use Beatty and
Crawford’s (2011) and Heufer’s (2008, 2012) application of a measure of predictive success to find a good tradeoff between
test power and efficiency. See Heufer and Hjertstrand (2017) for an application and discussion of this approach. We also
discuss the issue in Section 3 of this paper.
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revealed preferred and worse sets for the same subject. Evidently, the bounds are much tighter, and the
sets draw a much clearer picture of the kind of preference this subject exhibits.
This paper contributes to the possibilities of applying revealed preference methods to choice data,
which too often is confined to simply pre-testing data for consistency with utility maximization before
conducting further analysis. By showing how to practically recover preferences from choice data under
homotheticity, the tighter bounds make applications based on recovered preferences more attractive. As
seen in Figure 1, the approach also lends itself to a graphical analysis of the data, which can be used to
summarize a subject’s preference and use this to decide which functional form to be estimated.
Figure 1 provides a clear illustration of how useful the approach can be. The recovered sets make use
of the homothetically revealed preferred relation, which extends the standard revealed preference relation.
Every application that makes use of the recovered bounds on revealed preferred and worse sets can benefit
from the tighter bounds as long as the assumption of homotheticity can be justified. Note, however, that
our method can still suffer from problems of misspecification: if homothetic efficiency is low and the
standard revealed preference relation already contains a lot of information, homothetic bounds can be less
tight than the bounds calculated using Varian’s technique. Our applications include a way to identify the
cases where this caveat applies. For the experimental data we use, this is only the case for a few subjects.
We illustrate some of the possible applications using data from an experimental dictator game
conducted by Fisman et al. (2007). In particular, we show graphical examples of homothetically revealed
preferred and worse sets of four subjects with very different preferences, show how these sets can be used
to systematically classify choice data into different preference types, and demonstrate that homothetic
bounds on the money metric are typically much tighter.
The crucial part of our contribution is to show how to make Knoblauch’s (1993) technique operational
by using homothetic efficiency measures to adjust data which violate homotheticity because of minor
optimization or measurement error. Of course, this approach suffers from the same drawbacks associated
with imposing assumptions of functional forms of utility. However, this drawback is very limited compared
to assuming a specific functional form (such as the popular CES function), as we only impose the
assumption of homotheticity without any additional structure that comes with a particular utility
function.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 introduces the notation and some basic
definitions. Section 2.2 recalls the necessary tools to measure homothetic efficiency, which is required
for the adjustment of data. Section 2.3 shows how the approach of Knoblauch (1993) can be made
operational using the adjusted data. Section 3 proposes various applications and illustrates the approach
using experimental data. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theory
2.1 Preliminaries
This section briefly summarizes basic definitions and results. A more extensive overview of the relevant
concepts can be found in Sections 2 and 3 of Heufer and Hjertstrand (2017).
We use the following notation: For all x,y ∈ RL, x = y if xi ≥ yi for all i = 1, . . . , L; x ≥ y if x = y
and x 6= y; and x > y if xi > yi for all i = 1, . . . , L. We denote RL+ = {x ∈ RL : x = (0, . . . , 0)} and
RL++ = {x ∈ RL : x > (0, . . . , 0)}. The commodity space is RL+, and the price space is RL++, where L ≥ 2
is the number of different commodities. A budget set is defined as Bi = B(pi) = {x ∈ RL+ : pixi ≤ 1},
where pi = (pi1, . . . , p
i
L)
′ ∈ RL++ is the price vector, and income is normalized to 1. We observe N ≥ 1
different budgets and the corresponding demand of a consumer which is assumed to be exhaustive (i.e.,
pixi = 1). The entire set of observations on a consumer is denoted Ω = {(xi,pi)}Ni=1.
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The bundle xi is directly revealed preferred to a bundle x, written xi R0 x, if pixi ≥ pix; it is strictly
directly revealed preferred to x, written xi P0 x, if pixi > pix; it is revealed preferred to x if there exists a
sequence xj , . . ., xk, such that xi R0 xj R0 . . . xk R0 x; this is written as xi R x, where R is the transitive
closure of R0. The bundle xi is strictly revealed preferred to x, written xi P x, if xi R xj P0 xk R x for
some j, k = 1, . . . , N . We say that a utility function u : RL+ → R rationalizes a set of observations Ω if
u(xi) ≥ u(y) whenever xi R0 y.
A set of observations Ω satisfies the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) if for all
i, j = 1, . . . , N , it holds that [not xi P0 xj ] whenever xj R xi. Varian (1982) shows that GARP is a
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a monotonic and concave utility function that
rationalizes the data. He also shows how to recover preferences implicit in the data. For some bundle
x0 ∈ RL+ which was not necessarily observed as a choice, the set of prices which support x0 is defined as
S (x0) =
{
p0 ∈ RL++ : {(xi,pi)}Ni=0 satisfies GARP and p0x0 = 1
}
. (1)
The set S(x0) is used to provide boundaries on the indifference set. The set of all bundles which are
revealed worse than x0 is
RW (x0) =
{
x ∈ RL+ : for all p0 ∈ S(x0), x0 P x
}
(2)
and the set of all bundles which are revealed preferred to x0 is
RP(x0) =
{
x ∈ RL+ : for all p ∈ S(x), x P x0
}
. (3)
The convex hull of a set of points Y =
{
yi
}M
i=1
is defined as
{
x ∈ RL+ : there exist αi ∈ [0, 1],
∑M
i=1 αi =
1 such that x =
∑M
i=1 αiy
i
}
; the convex monotonic hull (CMH ) of a set of points Y is CMH (Y ) = convex
hull of
({
x ∈ RL+ : x ≥ yi for some i = 1, . . . ,M
})
. Let intCMH (Y ) denote the interior of CMH (Y ).
Varian (1982) and Knoblauch (1992) show that
intCMH ({xi : xi R x0}) ⊆ RP(x0) ⊆ CMH ({xi : xi R x0}), (4)
which can be used to easily check if x ∈ RP(x0) and also if x ∈ RW (x0), because x ∈ RW (x0)⇔ x0 ∈
RP(x) (see Varian 1982, Fact 3).
In practice, it is often the case that GARP is violated. That requires the use of efficiency measures to
adjust the revealed preference relation in order to remove the violation. A particularly efficient way to
do so is the Varian Efficiency Vector (VEV) described in Heufer and Hjertstrand (2017) and based on
a suggestion by Varian (1993). They define xi R0(vi) x if vip
ixi ≥ pix, with R(vi) being the transitive
closure and P0(vi) defined analogously. Then v = (v1, . . . , vN ) ∈ [0, 1]N is a VEV if it satisfies GARP(v)
(i.e., [not xi P0(vi) x
j ] whenever xj R(vj) x
i) and there does not exist an v′ ≥ v which satisfies GARP(v′).
The sets RP and RW can then be based on R(vi) instead of R. See Heufer and Hjertstrand (2017) for an
implementation and justification of this approach.
2.2 Testing for Homotheticity and Homothetic Efficiency
This section briefly introduces the concept of measuring homothetic efficiency. For more details, see
Heufer and Hjertstrand (2017).
A utility function is homothetic if it is a positive monotonic transformation of a linearly homogeneous
utility function; that is, if u(x) > u(y) then u(λx) > u(λy) for all λ > 0. Varian (1983) introduces
a homothetic analogue to GARP and shows that it is necessary and sufficient for homothetic utility
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maximization:
Definition 1 (Varian 1983). A set of observations Ω satisfies the Homothetic Axiom of Revealed
Preference (HARP) if for all distinct choices of indices i, j, . . . , `, it holds that (pixj)(pjxk) · · · (p`xi) ≥ 1.
Theorem 1 (Varian 1983). There exists a homothetic, monotonic, continuous, and concave utility
function which rationalizes the set of observations Ω if and only if Ω satisfies HARP.
Because data rarely satisfies HARP, Heufer (2013) and Heufer and Hjertstrand (2017) develop
approaches to measure homothetic efficiency. Similar to the Afriat Efficiency Index (Afriat 1972, also
known as the Critical Cost Efficiency Index), their Homothetic Efficiency Index (HEI) is a lower bound
that can be interpreted as wasted expenditure. A Homothetic Efficiency Vector (HEV) is a more
disaggregated measure of efficiency that provides information about inefficiency for each observation
rather than a lower bound for the entire data set. To define it, we first need the definition of HARP(h).
Definition 2 (Heufer and Hjertstrand 2017). A set of observations Ω satisfies HARP(h) for some
h = (h1, . . . , hN ) ∈ (0, 1]N if for all i, j = 1, . . . , N , it holds that
(
pixj
hi
)(
pjxk
hj
)
· · ·
(
p`xi
h`
)
≥ 1. (5)
An HEV is a vector h such that HARP(h) is satisfied and there does not exist a vector h′ ≥ h such
that HARP(h′) is also satisfied. In our approach to homothetic recoverability in Section 2.3, we only
make use of the HEV, but the approach could also be based on the HEI.
Heufer and Hjertstrand (2017) propose a linear programming procedure to calculate a first-order
approximation of the HEV for observed data. This procedure provides a generally applicable and
computationally efficient method for large data sets. However, for the data we use here, we can exploit
the fact that there are only two goods available (L = 2), which means that we can apply a pairwise
version of HARP, which Heufer (2013) has shown to be equivalent to HARP. In particular, for L = 2,
(pixj/hi)(p
jxi/hj) ≥ 1 for all i, j = 1, . . . , N is equivalent to HARP(h). A simple optimization problem
that maximizes the sum of all hi subject to the N
2 pairwise constraints is still computationally feasible
for N = 50. This allows to find an HEV that minimizes the distance to the unit vector in the L1-norm.
Note that the HEV is not necessarily unique, and that therefore optimal solution values may give
different adjusted data to work with. For example, different norms will lead to different HEV. As no
specific norm is generally superior to another, the choice of norm is ultimately arbitrary. We note,
however, that differences between HEV will be minor if violations of homotheticity are minor. Major
differences are to be expected if homothetic efficiency is low, but we do not recommend to apply methods
that assume homotheticity for those cases.3
Using the HEV for empirical work is well justified, as one can show that if HARP(h) is satisfied, there
exists a homothetic utility function that comes close to representing the data. For that, we say that a
utility function u h-rationalizes a set of observations Ω if u(xi) ≥ u(y) whenever xi R0(hi) y. Theorem 2
shows the relationship between HARP(h) and h-rationalization.
Theorem 2 (Heufer and Hjertstrand 2017). For any h = (h1, . . . , hN ) ∈ (0, 1]N , there exists a homothetic,
monotonic, continuous, and concave utility function that h-rationalizes the set of observations Ω if and
only if Ω satisfies HARP(h).
3Regarding the question of what level of homothetic efficiency is too low, see Footnote 2 in Section 1 and the references
therein.
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2.3 Homothetic Recoverability
Following Knoblauch (1993), define for a set of observations which satisfies HARP a scalar
ti,m = min
{
(pixj)(pjxk) · · · (p`xm)} , (6)
where the minimum is over all finite sequences i, j, . . . , ` between 1 and N inclusive, and ti,i = 1. Note
that we can also have m = 0 for a bundle x0 that was not observed as a choice. We can compute ti,0 as
we do not need a price vector p0. We say that ti,mx
i is homothetically revealed preferred to xm, written
ti,mx
i H xm. The scalar t = ti,m is the smallest value such that tx
i H xm.
Knoblauch (1993) also shows how to recover homothetic preferences implicit in a set of observations
which satisfies HARP. Define the set of bundles which are homothetically revealed preferred to xm as
HRP(xm) = intCMH
(
xm ∪
N⋃
i=1
ti,mx
i
)
. (7)
The set HRP(xm) is very useful indeed, as Theorem 3 below shows that it describes the set of bundles
which any rationalizing homothetic utility function must rank higher than xm. Define the set of bundles
which are homothetically revealed worse to xm as
HRW (xm) = {x ∈ RL+ : xm ∈ HRP(x)}. (8)
As HRP can be easily computed as the convex hull of a finite number of points, it is also easy to test for
any bundle if x ∈ HRW (xm).
Theorem 3 (Knoblauch 1993). If Ω satisfies HARP, then x ∈ HRP(xm) if and only if every homothetic,
monotonic, continuous, and concave utility function which rationalizes Ω satisfies u(x) > u(xm).
These definitions and results rely on the data satisfying HARP. If the data violate HARP, then there
exist observations such that (pixj)(pjxk) · · · (p`xi) < 1. These can again be multiplied with each other,
ad infinitum. Therefore, the scalars in Eq. 6 are not well defined, and the infimum is 0. Alternatively,
one could define the scalars over the shortest simple path, that is, by using every observation only once.
However, that would be computationally inefficient (to the point of being completely infeasible for larger
data sets), and we would not be able to obtain a result that justifies the approach like the one in Theorem
4 below. We therefore propose an approach that relies on adjusting the data by their homothetic efficiency.
Let h be an HEV of a set of observations Ω. Define
t˜i,m = min
{(
pixj
hihj
)(
pjxk
hjhk
)
· · ·
(
p`xm
h`hm
)}
. (9)
where, if m = 0 for a bundle x0, we set h0 = 1. The reason for this definition is that if we adjust the
data, we can only confidently state that (pixj/hi)x
i is homothetically revealed preferred to hjx
j but not
necessarily to xj . Note that λx H y implies x H y/λ, so we have (pixj/[hihj ])x
i H xj .
We say that t˜i,mx
i is homothetically revealed preferred at efficiency h to xm, written t˜i,mx
i H˜ xm. To
motivate this definition and show that it is useful, we first need to define the set of bundles which are
homothetically revealed preferred at efficiency vector h to xm as
H˜RPh(x
m) = intCMH
(
xm ∪
N⋃
i=1
t˜i,mx
i
)
, (10)
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and
H˜RW h(x
m) = {x ∈ RL+ : xm ∈ H˜RPh(x)}. (11)
Theorem 4 below justifies the use of H˜RPh and H˜RW h: It shows that every homothetic utility
function which h-rationalizes the data will not contradict our construction of the homothetically revealed
preferred and worse sets.
Theorem 4. If Ω satisfies HARP(h), then for every homothetic, monotonic, continuous, and concave
u which h-rationalizes Ω, it holds that H˜RPh(x
m) ⊆ {x ∈ RL+ : u(x) ≥ u(xm)} and H˜RWh(xm) ⊆{
x ∈ RL+ : u(x) ≤ u(xm)
}
.
The proof can be found in the appendix. Figure 2 shows examples to illustrate the construction.
Figure 2.(a) shows two observations; possible HEV are h = (
√
5/6,
√
5/6), h = (5/6, 1), and h = (1, 5/6).
Note that the two scalar factors t˜1,2 and t˜2,1 would be adjusted by dividing them by the product of h1
and h2, so the choice of h does not matter. Without adjustment, x
1 would be scaled up by (p1x2), but x2
is strictly revealed preferred over (p1x2)x1. Scaling x1 by (p1x2)/(5/6) instead resolves this conflict. In
Figure 2.(b) the choice x3 = (8, 16) with prices x3 = (1/24, 1/24) is added. For homotheticity, there is no
conflict between x1 and x3. Possible HEV include h = (
√
5/6,
√
5/6,
√
5/6) and h = (1, 5/6, 1). In this
example, the choice of h matters. Setting hi =
√
5/6 for i = 1, 2, 3 results in an unnecessary adjustment
between x1 and x3. By setting h1 and h3 to 1, we can scale up x
1 by (p1x3) instead of (p1x3)/(5/6).
The scalar factor between x1 and x2 is unaffected, as the adjustment would be by
√
5/6
√
5/6 = 5/6 for
both proposed choices of h.
Figure 2.(c) shows RP (hatched) and H˜RP (solid) for x3. Note that the homothetically revealed
preferred set is contained in the standard set, that is, the bounds are tighter without homotheticity. This
is because x2 is already directly revealed preferred to x3 but has to be scaled up in order to adjust for
violations of homotheticity. Figure 2.(d) replaces x2 with xˆ2, which is not revealed preferred to x3. This
does not change homothetic efficiency as xˆ2 is on the same ray as x2 and chosen on a budget parallel to
the one on which x2 was chosen. Hence, H˜RP remains unchanged while RP shrinks. This example also
illustrates that whether or not homothetic bounds are tighter depends not only on homothetic efficiency,
but also on how much information is already contained in the standard revealed preference relation.
3 Applications
In this section we illustrate some of the possible applications of our approach using data from Fisman
et al. (2007). The data comes from an experimental dictator game in which a subject (the dictator) had
to divide money between himself and some other subject (the recipient). The payoffs for the two subjects
can be interpreted as two distinct goods. The transfer rate between the dictator and recipient varied, such
that for every unit given up by the dictator, the recipient could receive more or less than one unit, which
implies different prices for the two goods. Thus, subjects chose from budget sets as defined in Section
2.1. Fisman et al. (2007) estimate CES utility functions for their data. As this function is homothetic,
applying the assumption of homotheticity without a particular functional form as we do here is still less
restrictive. In terms of robustness (i.e., drawing conclusions not justified by the data), our approach
lies between using only the revealed preference relation to recover bounds and estimating parameters
of a homothetic utility function. The greater the homothetic efficiency, the closer the robustness of our
approach is to that of the former.
The data set is well suited for our illustration because there are only two goods. This facilitates a
graphical illustration, and the recovered preferences are easy to interpret in terms of social preferences.
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Figure 2: (a) Example with choices x1 = (8, 8), x2 = (18, 9) and prices p1 = (1/24, 1/12), p2 =
(1/24, 1/36). (b) The choice x3 = (8, 16) with prices x3 = (1/24, 1/24) is added to the previous example.
(c) Revealed preferred (hatched) and homothetically revealed preferred set (solid) of x3. (d) Choice
x2 with prices p2 is replaced by xˆ2 = (9, 4.5) with prices pˆ2 = (2/18, 2/9), which changes the revealed
preferred set of x3.
Furthermore, the subjects chose from 50 different budgets, which provides a rich data set. Note that given
the large number of observations, there is already a lot to recover about preferences without homotheticity,
so we compare our approach with an already quite informative benchmark. For simplicity, we will refer
to the non-homothetic benchmarks as the “standard” case.
Subjects in Fisman et al. (2007) were not required to spend the entire endowment; instead, they could
click with the mouse on or below a line representing the budget. Most subjects picked bundles on or very
close to the budget line, but a few made unreasonable choices far below the line. Fisman et al. (2007) also
address this issue and exclude 12 (15.79%) of the 76 subjects from their analysis because their choices
were too wasteful; we do the same here and only present the result for the remaining 64 subjects. We use
the mean of each subject’s VEV and HEV to characterize their level of efficiency; the mean (median)
over the 64 subjects is 0.989 (0.999) for the VEV, and 0.964 (0.978) for the HEV. Heufer and Hjertstrand
(2017) define a misspecification index based on vector efficiency (MSIV), which is the average normalized
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difference between the values of the VEV and HEV. It measures by how much more data which have
already been adjusted to fit the utility maximization model need to be adjusted to also fit the homothetic
model. The mean (median) of the MSIV over all 64 subjects is 0.020 (0.023).
3.1 Graphical Illustrations
Choi et al. (2007b) already provide a short illustrative graphical analysis of revealed preferred and
worse sets for data on risk preferences collected by Choi et al. (2007a). We extend this approach
using our homothetically revealed preferred and worse sets. Figure 3 shows the recovered standard and
homothetically revealed preferred and worse sets of four subjects of Fisman et al. (2007) with different
prototypical preferences. As in Figure 1, the hatched areas show the revealed preferred set RP(x) and the
revealed worse set RW (x) using the revealed preference relation adjusted by the VEV. The solidly filled
areas show the corresponding homothetically revealed preferred and worse sets, H˜RPh(x) and H˜RW h(x),
respectively. The bundles for which Figure 3 shows the bounds on preferred and worse sets are indicated
in the figure; they are actually chosen bundles that are representative of the respective subjects’ choices.
Note how much narrower the space between the homothetically revealed preferred and worse sets is
compared to the standard sets. For all subjects presented in Figure 3, homothetic efficiency is high and
misspecification is low.4 We therefore have high confidence in the validity of the recovered bounds.
For Figure 3, we have chosen four subjects whose preferences are diverse, ranging from strong inequality
aversion to a strong preference for maximizing the sum of the two payoffs, and another one who is very
selfish. Nonetheless, they all come close to preferences that can be represented by the CES utility function
u(x1, x2) = (αx
ρ
1 + (1−α)xρ2)1/ρ with α ∈ [0, 1] and ρ ≤ 1. The four prototypical utility functions defined
below are all nested within the CES function (Mas-Colell et al. 1995, p. 97).
The subject in Figure 3.(a) clearly exhibits almost perfectly selfish preferences, that is, u(x1, x2) = x1.
This function is obtained from the CES function by setting α = 1 (with arbitrary ρ). Figure 3.(b) shows
the preferences of a subject who considers own payoff and payoff for somebody else to be almost perfect
substitutes and is therefore very concerned about the total amount, that is, u(x1, x2) = x1 + x2. This
function corresponds to α = 1/2 and ρ = 1 in the CES function. In sharp contrast, the subject in
Figure 3.(c) exhibits preferences that come close to maximizing the minimum payout for the dictator and
recipient, that is, they come close to maximizing the Rawls (or Leontief) function u(x1, x2) = min{x1, x2}
(Rawls 1971). This function is obtained as ρ → −∞ with α = 1/2. Figure 3.(d) shows preferences of
a subject who comes close to maximizing a Cobb-Douglas function xα1x
1−α
2 with α close to 1/2. This
subject therefore comes close to maximizing the Nash product, that is, u(x1, x2) = x1x2 (Nash 1950),
which strikes a balance between inequality and the total amount that is paid out. This function is
obtained as ρ→ 0 with α = 1/2.
This section demonstrates the potential of graphical inspection and illustrates how much there is to
learn from homothetic recoverability. A more systematic analysis is conducted in Section 3.3, where we
use several ways to classify subjects based on which of the four preferences their choices come closest to.
3.2 Money Metric
Varian (1982) considers the revealed preference implications for Samuelson’s (1974) “money metric”
cardinalization of utility. The money metric utility of a bundle x0 at prices p0 is the amount a consumer
must spend to obtain the utility associated with x0 at prices p0. Varian provides an approximation of
the upper bound on the true money metric function; Knoblauch (1992) shows that this bound is already
4The mean (median) of the HEV values are: Subject 8: 0.995 (0.996); subject 27: 0.987 (0.990); subject 16: 0.954
(0.972); subject 35: 0.992 (0.993); subject 14 (Figure 1): 0.989 (0.990). The MSIV values are: Subject 8: 0.004; subject 27:
0.009; subject 16: 0.028; subject 35: 0.007; subject 14: 0.011.
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x2
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x2
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x2
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Figure 3: Standard and homothetically revealed preferred and worse sets for four subjects with prototypical
preferences: (a) Selfish preferences, subject 8; (b) perfect substitutes, subject 27; (c) Rawls or Leontief
preferences, subject 16; (d) Nash preferences, subject 35. Data from Fisman et al. (2007).
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the best possible bound given the observed data. In Knoblauch (1993) she suggests to base the upper
bound not on the revealed preferred but the homothetically revealed preferred set. If the assumption of
homotheticity can be justified, this can provide a considerably tighter bound on the money metric.
In particular, if homothetic efficiency is the same as the standard efficiency (i.e., the data requires
no further adjustment in addition to what is necessary to fit the utility maximization model), then
the homothetic bounds will be tighter. If instead homothetic efficiency is considerably lower and large
additional adjustments are needed, then the homothetic bounds are not necessarily tighter. In that sense,
the ratio of the homothetic and standard bounds can be interpreted as a measure for how useful it is to
adjust the data to fit the homothetic model; see also the discussion of the results in Table 1 below.
The difference between the standard money metric and the homothetic money metric quantifies the
differences of the extents to which preferences can be recovered from the data. Revisiting the idea of
the money metric is also very useful because of the recent application of the money metric function to
parametric recoverability by Halevy et al. (2018). When their approach is used to recover preferences of a
homothetic utility function, imposing homotheticity on the money metric function does not add further
restrictions and optimally exploits the information contained in the data. Blackorby and Donaldson
(1988) show that money metric utility functions for arbitrary reference prices are generally not concave
unless preferences are homothetic, which also adds to the attractiveness of our approach.
Varian (1982) defines the upper bound of the money metric function as m+(p0,x0) = infx∈RP(x0) p0x.
Knoblauch (1992) clarifies some issues and shows that the following more practically useful definition is
equivalent:
m+(p0,x0) = min p0xi such that xi R x0. (12)
Knoblauch (1993) introduces the homothetic money metric function based on HRP(x0):
hm+(p0,x0) = min
x∈HRP(x0)
p0x (13)
= min
i∈{0,...,N}
{p0 ti,0xi}.
Figure 4 illustrates the idea. It shows the bounds of the standard and homothetically revealed
preferred sets of an arbitrary bundle x0. The x that minimizes p0x such that x ∈ RP(x0) is xi; thus,
m+(p0,x0) = p0xi = λ1. Then the budget line with p
0 divided by λ1 (or equivalently, the budget
line with expenditure λ1) passes through x
i. The bound for the homothetic money metric function is
hm+(p0,x0) = p0 ti,0x
i = λ2, which is a considerably tighter upper bound than λ1.
A particularly useful application of the money metric is to evaluate bundles that have not been
observed as a choice at prices not faced by decision makers and to predict the utility an individual would
experience from it. To illustrate the differences between money metric and homothetic money metric,
we therefore evaluate the same bundle (which has never been chosen) at the same price vector (which
subjects never faced) for every subject. We use the mean demand of all subjects, x¯ = (41.161, 10.074),
as the bundle and evaluate it at prices q with q1 = q2 such that qx¯ = 1; this also means that if there
is no relevant information in the data at all, both m+(q, x¯) and hm+(q, x¯) will be equal to 1. We also
repeated the analysis with price ratios of 1/2 and 2 and obtained qualitatively similar results, which we
will not report here. If assuming homotheticity does indeed allow to construct tighter upper bounds,
hm+(q, x¯) should be smaller than m+(q, x¯). We note that the difference between the two values could
also be helpful for deciding whether or not it is justified to assume homotheticity; for a subject with
tighter bounds without homotheticity, it might be better not to.
Table 1 shows the mean values over all subjects and various percentiles. It also shows the means and
11
HRP(x0)
RP(x0)
B(p/λ1)
B(p/λ2)
λ1λ2
x0
xi
ti,0x
i
x1
x2
Figure 4: A tighter upper bound for the money metric utility function. The revealed preferred set RP(x0)
is contained in the homothetically revealed preferred set HRP(x0); the figure only shows their boundaries.
The upper money metric bound m+(p,x0) is equal to λ1, as px is minimized at px
i, while the homothetic
upper money metric bound hm+(p,x0) is equal to λ2.
percentiles of the individual ratios of the homothetic and standard money metric as well as the differences.
The mean of the lower bounds for the standard money metric is 0.978, which is noticeably greater than
the mean of the lower bounds for the homothetic money metric at 0.91; this general finding is confirmed
by the ratios and the differences.
Money metric evaluations of mean demand with q1/q2 = 1
mean p5 p25 p50 p75 p95
m+(q, x¯) (standard) 0.978 0.906 0.964 0.995 1.000 1.000
hm+(q, x¯) (homothetic) 0.910 0.823 0.845 0.916 0.991 1.000
m+(q, x¯)/hm+(q, x¯) (ratios) 1.081 0.988 1.000 1.052 1.142 1.206
m+(q, x¯)− hm+(q, x¯) (differences) 0.067 -0.012 0.000 0.048 0.119 0.168
Table 1: Upper bounds of the standard and homothetic money metric utility function for a price ratio of
one with normalized price vectors for the mean demand (x¯ = (41.161, 10.074)), for the 64 participants
without excessively wasteful choices. Data from Fisman et al. (2007).
We consider this to be an economically significant improvement on the tightness of the upper bound
of the money metric. However, it is important to note that the improvement is not universal, as we can
already see by the result for the 5th percentile. Figure 5 shows an example of a subject for which the
bound is tighter without homotheticity; it is caused by the necessity to adjust a small number of choices
considerably more to achieve consistency with HARP than with GARP.
Figure 6 shows a scatter plot of the results. Points below the 45◦ line show the subjects whose choices,
due to low homothetic efficiency compared to standard efficiency, require so much adjustment that the
bound on the money metric is less tight under homotheticity. There are 5 (7.81%) subjects for whom this
is the case. In total, there are 19 (29.69%) for whom the difference is less than 0.01 and 32 (50.00%)
for whom the difference is less than 0.05. As expected, the benefit depends on the level of homothetic
efficiency and, in particular, on the extent of misspecification. The correlation coefficient between the
ratios and (i) the mean HEV is 0.362 and (ii) the MSIV is -0.438. The correlation coefficient between the
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Figure 5: Revealed preferred (hatched) and homothetically revealed preferred (solid) sets of subject 74 at
x¯ = (41.161, 10.074) and a budget line through x¯ with a price vector q = (q1, q2) such that q1 = q2 and
qx¯ = 1. Even though the mean HEV for this subject is 0.933, two choices have to be adjusted by an hi
of 0.772 and 0.779 respectively, while the minimum of the VEV is 0.939. Accordingly, this subject has a
moderately high MSIV of 0.055. As a result, the RP set is not always completely contained in HRP . In
this case, the bound for the standard money metric is tighter than for the homothetic money metric, that
is, m+(q, x¯) < hm+(q, x¯).
differences and (i) the mean HEV is 0.401 and (ii) the MSIV is -0.476.
We conclude that assuming homotheticity allows us to construct significantly tighter bounds for at least
half of the subjects while it is rare that the assumption leads to worse results. This demonstrates that in
most cases, assuming homotheticity allows the researcher to draw more precise conclusions. Nonetheless,
the findings highlight the importance of carefully considering the level of homothetic efficiency and testing
if assuming homotheticity really does add to the analysis in a meaningful way. The differences in the
bounds on the money metric can guide the researcher in interpreting the practical effects of choosing the
homothetic model, as even a high level of homothetic efficiency does not necessarily lead to considerably
tighter bounds.
3.3 Classification
Classifying subjects into preference types can be helpful to obtain an overview of the data and the extent
of heterogeneity between subjects. In the context of dictator games, Andreoni and Miller (2002) and
Porter and Adams (2016) classify their subjects depending on how close their choices come to being
generated by certain prototypical utility functions. For example, Andreoni and Miller (2002) use three of
the four utility functions that we define in Section 3.1 (selfish, perfect substitutes, Rawls) and classify
subjects based on which one of the utility functions generates choices that are closest in terms of Euclidean
distance to the choices made by a subject. The four examples of our analysis in Section 3.1 (see Figure 3)
indicate that it should be possible to use the tight homothetic bounds on preferred and worse sets to
classify choices. Alternatively, we can use the homothetic money metric to evaluate “distance” between
choices in economic terms rather than Euclidean. We use both approaches to determine which of the four
utility functions defined in Section 3.1 come closest to the recovered preferences of subjects in Fisman
et al. (2007). Note that neither Andreoni and Miller (2002) nor Porter and Adams (2016) use the Nash
utility function. We use it here because it is an intermediate case between the two extreme cases of Rawls
and perfect substitutes preferences. It also appears to be an empirically relevant case as several subjects
do exhibit preferences like those shown in Figure 3.(d).
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Figure 6: Scatter plot of the bounds on the homothetic and standard money metric for each subject at
the mean demand x¯. Data from Fisman et al. (2007).
To use the bounds on preferred and worse sets, we proceed as follows. For each subject, we generate
choices on each budget by maximizing the prototypical utility functions. For each prototypical choice
on each budget, we construct the homothetically revealed preferred set for that choice based on the
actual choices of that subject. We then count how many of the other prototypical choices are in that
set. If, say, the choice implied by Rawls preferences is in the homothetically revealed preferred set of the
choice implied by Nash preferences, we can conclude that the subject prefers the Rawls choice over the
Nash choice. We then classify subjects according to which set of prototypical choices is most frequently
preferred.
For each subject, let i ∈ {1, . . . , 50} be the index of the 50 budgets. Let j, k ∈ {selfish, perfect
substitutes, Rawls, Nash} be indices for choices generated by the four prototypical utility functions. Let yij
be the bundle that maximizes utility function j on budget i. Note that H˜RPh(y
i
j) is the homothetically
revealed preferred set of yij based on the subject’s choices. The bundle chosen on budget i by the subject,
xi, will be different from yij unless the subject happened to choose exactly the bundle that maximizes
utility function j on that budget. Therefore, budget i will often intersect H˜RPh(y
i
j); the question is if
one of the other prototypical choices yik, k 6= j, are included in it. Let ck be the score for utility function
k; it counts for how many budgets the subject prefers the bundle that maximizes utility function k over
the bundle that maximizes one of the other three utility functions. The following pseudo-code describes
the procedure.
for k ∈ {selfish, perfect substitutes,Rawls,Nash} do
set ck = 0;
for j ∈ {selfish, perfect substitutes,Rawls,Nash} do
for i ∈ {1, . . . , 50} do
if yik ∈ H˜RPh(yij) then
set ck = ck + 1;
Each ck will be between 50 and 200. Each subject will be classified as being closest to the prototypical
utility function associated with the greatest ck.
This way of classifying choices leads to an interesting observation. Suppose that a subject in a dictator
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game always gives away a very small amount to the recipient (x2) and keeps the rest (x1). The choices will
be near the x1-axis but never on it. By the construction of HRP , the homothetically revealed preferred
sets of these choices will never contain a point on the x1-axis. A choice y generated by maximizing the
perfectly selfish prototypical utility function, however, will always be on the x1-axis. This y will therefore
never be in any HRP(x0) unless x0 is itself on the x1-axis, and the subject will not be classified as selfish.
This is even more relevant when using RP instead. In the homothetic case, a single choice on the x1-axis
can be scaled and makes it possible for all HRP sets to contain parts of the x1-axis, which is not the case
for RP .
We consider this to be neither better nor worse than other ways of classification, but rather as a
complementary view. An individual with the utility function u(x1, x2) = x
1−ε
1 x
ε
2 will make choices near
the x1-axis for small enough ε, and not classifying this individual as being closest to selfishness may seem
odd. But it is indeed the case that for all ε > 0 this individual will prefer any other bundle over the
perfectly selfish one, with the exception of the opposite extreme on the x2-axis.
For the second approach, we evaluate each of the prototypical choices yij using the homothetic money
metric function, that is, we compute hm+(pi,yij) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , 50} and all j ∈ {selfish, perfect
substitutes, Rawls, Nash} and classify each subject as being closest to the prototypical utility function
associated with the j with the greatest mean homothetic money metric.
The results for these two approaches are shown in Table 2. The table also shows the results based on
the same approaches without homotheticity, that is, based on RP instead of HRP , and on m+ instead
of hm+. As expected, classification based on homothetic revealed preferred sets leads to considerably
fewer subjects being classified as selfish, and the difference is even greater for standard revealed preferred
sets. Classification based on HRP leads to more Rawls and fewer Nash types than classification based
on RP . Figure 3.(c) and (d) might help to explain this. The part of the preferred and worse sets that
are recovered without homotheticity are quite similar for the two subjects, while the recovered parts
under homotheticity allow to draw a clearer distinction between the two. Classification results based
on the money metric appear to be somewhat between those based on Euclidean distance and revealed
preferred sets, with only minor differences between hm+ and m+. As discussed in Section 3.2, part of the
advantage of hm+ over m+ comes into play when evaluating bundles at prices not faced by subjects. It
is possible that assuming homotheticity here does not make much of a difference since the prices used for
the money metric evaluations are those that subjects actually were presented with.
Preference types
Method Selfish Perfect substitutes Rawls Nash
Euclidean distance 43 (67.19%) 5 (7.81%) 3 (4.69%) 13 (20.31%)
Money metric 39 (60.94%) 2 (3.12%) 1 (1.56%) 22 (34.38%)
Homothetic money metric 37 (57.81%) 5 (7.81%) 2 (3.12%) 20 (31.25%)
Revealed preferred 27 (42.19%) 4 (6.25%) 2 (3.12%) 31 (48.44%)
Homothetically revealed preferred 31 (48.44%) 3 (4.69%) 10 (15.62%) 20 (31.25%)
Table 2: Classification of the 64 participants without excessively wasteful choices. Participants are
assigned to one of four prototypical preference types using various methods. Data from Fisman et al.
(2007).
Experimental data as well as large household demand panel or cross-section data sets can also be
analyzed in terms of how many preference types there are, either by finding the minimal partition of the
data such that each part is perfectly rationalizable (see Crawford and Pendakur 2013) or by finding the
number of types depending on a threshold for a measure of difference between them (see Castillo and
Freer 2018). The approaches depend on consistency with GARP and GARP-based efficiency measures,
but could also be conducted in terms of HARP. As HARP is a more stringent condition, one would
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naturally expect to need a greater number of types to represent the data. For example, two households
with very different incomes will choose from very different budgets which are likely to not intersect. It
may then be possible to represent both by the same utility function, even if it is a utility function that
leads to very different budget allocations at the two different income levels, while it may not be possible
to represent the households by the same homothetic utility function. Whether this is a desirable result or
not depends among other things on whether or not it is reasonable to assume homotheticity in the given
context.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we provide methods to recover homothetic preferences from choice data and illustrate how
this can be used when data do not perfectly satisfy homotheticity but come close to it. The illustrations
are based on experimental data because the methods in this paper were motivated by and are particularly
well suited for the kind of data encountered in experimental economics. Recovering much of a preference
on an individual level requires choices under various different relative prices, and as experimenters are free
to choose the budgets offered to subjects, that data is easy to observe in the lab. Experiments are also
often conducted with research questions on individual preferences and preference heterogeneity among
individuals in mind. Those are questions for which the methods provided here are particularly helpful.
There are many other applications possible which we did not consider in detail here. In general,
every application that relies on revealed preferred and worse sets can potentially be improved with our
method. For example, Heufer (2014) shows how to use revealed preference to operationalize Yaari’s
(1969) approach to comparative risk aversion. He compares the risk aversion implicit in choices over
lotteries between different individuals based on their revealed preferred and worse sets. He finds that
there are pairs of subjects whose choices do not reveal enough information in order to distinguish their
level of risk aversion. Given how much more we can recover under homotheticity, the approach can benefit
from using homothetically revealed preferred and worse set rather than the standard ones whenever the
assumption of homotheticity is justified. As a further example, consider Halevy et al. (2018) method
to estimate parameters of a utility function by minimizing a loss function corresponding to the money
metric index proposed by Varian (1990). As the bounds on the money metric function can be tightened
using homothetic revealed preferences, our approach can be used to estimate parameters by optimally
exploiting the information contained in choice data under homotheticity.
Heufer and Hjertstrand (2017) also compute homothetic efficiency of demand for consumption goods
by households using a large panel data set. The methods introduced in this paper build on that concept
of homothetic efficiency, but applications to household demand data requires to address some additional
issues.
First, recent literature has shown that household behavior can potentially be better explained by a
collective household model (Cherchye et al. 2007, 2011a, Cherchye et al. 2011b, Aguiar and Kashaev 2017).
Our approach can be modified to recover homothetic preferences in the collective household model based
on the revealed preference characterization by Cherchye et al. (2011a). In this context, the assumption
of homotheticity may not only give tighter bounds on indifference curves but it may also allow for a
more efficient procedure to test the collective household model (see also Shananin and Tarasov (2017) on
computational issues under the assumption of homotheticity).
Second, we need to compare our approach to the related work by Blundell et al. (2003, 2007, 2008)
and Blundell et al. (2015). These authors use empirical expansion paths in combination with revealed
preference theory to conduct welfare analysis in a population of heterogeneous households. Their approach
is largely based on the assumption that there exists demand data for (different) cross-sections of households
16
drawn at consecutive time periods. Our approach of preference recoverability is not suitable for some of
this kind of data, as we require choices on the level of an individual or a single household. On the other
hand, while it would be possible to use non- or semi-parametric methods to estimate individual Engel
curves in experimental data, the amount of data required is usually not available on an individual level.
The approach of Blundell et al. (2003, 2007, 2008) and Blundell et al. (2015) is applicable to aggregated
time series data to analyze the preferences of a representative consumer or to each individual household
in household survey panel data; however, the latter case requires a sufficient amount of data so that
non-parametric estimation of individual household Engel curves is possible. In contrast, our approach
can be meaningfully applied to data sets with only a small number of observations. This also illustrates
the difference in how the two approaches deal with heterogeneity. While the approach of Blundell
et al. (2003, 2007, 2008) and Blundell et al. (2015) assumes that observable characteristics can capture
much of the heterogeneity between households, we can apply our approach to each individual household
or experimental subjects and therefore avoid any assumptions about preference homogeneity across
individuals.
We believe that revealed preference methods have more to offer than only testing data for consistency
with a particular decision model. In this paper we have demonstrated that using efficiency measures to
make small adjustments to data that are close to consistency with homotheticity allows to learn much
about preferences implicit in choice data and can open up a range of applications. We hope that our
paper thereby contributes to the growing literature aiming to establish nonparametric revealed preference
analysis as a robust complement to parametric analysis.
A Appendix
Proof of Theorem 4. By induction. Suppose u is homothetic, monotonic, continuous, and concave, and
h-rationalizes the data. By definition, we can assume without loss of generality that u is homogeneous of
degree 1. Because u is concave, we only need to consider the vertices of the closure of H˜RPh, that is, we
only need to check if u(t˜i,mx
i) < u(xm) is possible.
Step 1 By homogeneity of degree 1, u([pixm/(hihm)]x
i) = [pixm/(hihm)]u(x
i). Let y = [hixm]/[pixm];
then piy = hi, and therefore x
i R0(hi) y. Suppose u([p
ixm/(hihm)]x
i) < u(xm). Then u(xi) <
(hihm/[p
ixm])u(xm). But with hm ≤ 1, (hihm/[pixm])u(xm) ≤ (hi/[pixm])u(xm) = u(y). Then
u(xi) < u(y), but xi R0(hi) y, so u cannot h-rationalize Ω. Thus, ([p
ixm]/hihm)u(x
i) ≥ u(xm).
Step 2 Assume without loss of generality that
t˜1,n =
p1x2
h1h2
p2x3
h2h3
. . .
pn−1xn
hn−1hn
and that t˜1,m = t˜1,n[p
nxm]/(hnhm). Suppose t˜1,nu(x
1) ≥ u(xn). Then
t˜1,mu(x
1) = t˜1,nu(x
1)
pnxm
hnhm
≥ u(xn)p
nxm
hnhm
≥ u(xm),
where the last inequality follows from Step 1. Thus, t˜1,mu(x
1) ≥ u(xm). By induction, Steps 1 and 2
show that u(t˜i,mx
i) ≥ u(xm) for all i and all homothetic u which h-rationalize Ω. That concludes the
proof for H˜RP . The second part of the theorem then follows from the definition of H˜RW .
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